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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
In these consolidated appeals Reginald McGlory 
challenges the results of two forfeiture proceedings. The 
first appeal requires that we revisit the question of the 
notice that the United States must provide when it pursues 
forfeiture proceedings against the property of an 
incarcerated defendant in its custody. The second concerns 
the District Court's use of the doctrine of laches to prevent 
McGlory from challenging a forfeiture proceeding in which 
the notice given for the forfeiture is later discovered to be 
constitutionally inadequate. 
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In the first appeal, which concerns forfeiture of certain 
items of jewelry, the government directed notice by certified 
mail to the facility in which McGlory was incarcerated. 
McGlory maintains that he did not receive the notice, and 
that the government should have ensured that he received 
personal notification of the proceedings against his 
property. In United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 
2000) (en banc), which involved different property of 
McGlory's that was subject to administrative forfeiture, this 
Court ruled that merely sending notice to the Marshals 
Service, in whose custody McGlory was held, did not satisfy 
the Constitution. We held that "at a minimum, due process 
requires that when a person is in the government's custody 
and detained at a place of its choosing, notice of a pending 
administrative forfeiture proceeding must be mailed to the 
detainee at his or her place of confinement." Id. at 674. We 
noted, however, that "[w]hether anything more is required 
is not presently before us." Id. This appeal squarely 
presents the question whether "more" is required. McGlory 
asks that we rule the judicial forfeitures at issue in this 
case invalid because he did not receive actual  notice of the 
proceedings. 
 
As in all cases in which proper notice under the Due 
Process Clause is at issue, the touchstone of analysis is 
whether the notice was "reasonably calculated, under all 
the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to 
present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
& Trust, Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The government 
urges that mailing a letter by first-class mail to the location 
of the interested party is always sufficient. McGlory, in 
contrast, argues that a higher standard should prevail 
when the party is held in custody by the same government 
that wishes to serve notice upon him. He maintains that 
the government was in the position to ensure actual notice 
of the proceedings. Such notice has been required by 
several of our sister circuits, most notably by the Second 
Circuit in Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 
Though there is much to recommend the actual notice 
standard when the United States Attorney is dealing with 
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federal prisoners and detainees, we are not prepared to 
require the government to bear the evidentiary burden of 
establishing actual notice in all cases. Such a 
 780<!>demonstration could impose needless litigation costs, 
 
especially if the due process challenge arises years after the 
conclusion of the initial proceedings. Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has never required the demonstration of 
actual notice. At all events, the jurisprudence of 
constitutional notice appropriately focuses not on what 
actually occurred, but rather on the procedures that were 
in place when notice was attempted. Evaluating the 
adequacy of these procedures requires consideration of the 
context in which they occur. 
 
We conclude that the circumstances surrounding the 
federal government's incarceration of a prisoner require 
greater efforts at ensuring notice than would be expected 
for individuals at liberty in society. When one is in prison, 
the relative difficulty to the government to effect actual 
notice is reduced, while the ability of prisoners to ensure 
that they receive notices directed to them suffers. However, 
we stop short of the Weng standard and adopt an approach 
that focuses on the extent that procedures are reasonably 
likely to effect actual notice. Under this regime, the 
government's obligations do not end at the mailbox. Rather, 
we hold that if the government wishes to rely on direct 
mail, it bears the burden of demonstrating that procedures 
at the receiving facility were reasonably calculated to deliver 
the notice to the intended recipient. On this record, we 
cannot determine whether such a system was in place in 
McGlory's facility. We will therefore vacate the judgment 
and remand to the District Court for further factual 
findings on the sufficiency of the notice. 
 
In the second forfeiture now before us, which concerns 
certain electronic equipment, the notice provided to 
McGlory concededly fell short of the constitutional 
minimum. The government contends, however, that 
McGlory's attempt to recover the forfeited property is barred 
by the doctrine of laches, and the District Court agreed. We 
conclude that the doctrine of laches should not be 
considered when the issue is whether a judgment is void. If 
McGlory unreasonably delayed in seeking the recovery of 
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his property, the proper time to raise the issue is in a 
proceeding in which he seeks recovery from the 
government. The District Court will have to consider 
whether such recovery is available by a motion to vacate 
that arises under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b) or if McGlory will 
have to proceed by other means. We will therefore vacate 
the District Court's judgment that McGlory's action was 
barred by laches. 
 
I. 
 
This is the third time that forfeitures of McGlory's 
property have come before this Court, and the facts 
surrounding his arrest and detention are described several 
times in the Federal Reporter, most recently in United 
States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); 
see also United States v. $184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d 
Cir. 1995); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 
1992) (upholding McGlory's criminal conviction and 
sentence). We therefore need not rescribe this story save for 
the highlights. 
 
On September 8, 1989, Pittsburgh police officers and 
Drug Enforcement Administration agents arrested McGlory 
for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute. 
He was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to possess and 
distribute heroin, possession of heroin with intent to 
distribute, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, use 
of a firearm in a drug trafficking operation, and laundering 
drug proceeds. He received a life sentence. On the date of 
his arrest, the officers searched several residences used by 
McGlory and seized numerous items of property, including, 
at issue in this appeal, one Toshiba color television set, two 
answering machines, one Health Tech computer, and 
assorted jewelry. In 1990, the United States Attorney 
instituted civil judicial forfeiture actions against these items 
under 21 U.S.C. S 881. 
 
Until McGlory was sentenced on February 11, 1991, he 
was in the custody of the United States Marshals Service, 
and was housed in various detention facilities with which it 
had contracted. In initiating the forfeiture against the 
jewelry, the government mailed notice of the action to 
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McGlory care of the Ohio County Jail in Wheeling, West 
Virginia, where he was apparently being held at the time. 
The notice was received at the jail on November 9, 1990 
and signed for by one of the jail's officers. The government 
also sent notice to the jail by regular mail and mailed notice 
by certified mail to one of McGlory's pre-incarceration 
residences. That letter was not accepted. Finally, the 
government sent notice to McGlory's ex-wife, and to an 
attorney by the name of William Magann,1  and it published 
notice for three consecutive weeks in a general circulation 
newspaper. No one filed a claim or answer as directed by 
the notice to those seeking to contest the forfeiture. A 
default judgment was entered in the government's favor on 
January 7, 1991. The government ultimately sold the 
jewelry for $9,950. 
 
The government also initiated forfeiture proceedings 
against the television set and the other equipment, mailing 
the notice to an address used by McGlory. The government 
also sent notice to McGlory's mother and Magann and 
published notice in a newspaper. This proceeding was 
resolved by default judgment in the government's favor on 
May 31, 1990. 
 
McGlory maintains that he never received any notice, and 
he was unaware of any of the forfeiture proceedings until 
December 1993. On April 11, 1994, he filed a pro se motion 
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 41(e), seeking return of all 
the property that had been seized from him. The District 
Court dismissed the motion without prejudice on January 
6, 1997, and McGlory promptly filed a motion to reconsider 
the denial of his 41(e) motion. Shortly thereafter, he filed a 
motion to vacate the judgments in the two earlier 
proceedings. The Magistrate Judge to whom the case was 
assigned concluded that no constitutional notice violation 
occurred in the jewelry forfeiture proceeding, but that there 
was a violation in the proceeding concerning the electronic 
equipment. Notwithstanding this conclusion, he 
recommended that this claim be dismissed based on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In proceedings below, McGlory claimed not to know who Magann is, 
and the government does not contend that he represented McGlory in 
this matter. 
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doctrine of laches because: (a) McGlory had inexcusably 
delayed seeking recovery of the property; and (b) this delay 
was prejudicial to the government. Relying on the 
 780<!>Magistrate Judge's report, the District Court denied 
 
McGlory's motion to vacate the judgments on September 
23, 1998. McGlory filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction over the forfeiture 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, 1345, and 1355, and 
over the motion to vacate judgment under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1331. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's 
final order under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review over 
constitutional issues is plenary, see United States v. 
Various Computers & Computer Equip., 82 F.3d 582, 589 
(3d Cir. 1996), as is our review of the legal components of 
the laches issue, see Bermuda Express, N.V. v. M/V Litsa 
(Ex. Laurie U), 872 F.2d 554, 557 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
II. 
 
The central issue in the appeal from the jewelry forfeiture 
is whether a pretrial detainee is entitled to actual notice of 
judicial forfeiture proceedings initiated against him.2 The 
District Court concluded that attempting service in jail via 
the mail satisfied constitutional requirements for the 
service of notice. It primarily relied upon two cases. First, 
it looked to our opinion in United States v. $184,505.01, 72 
F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995), another McGlory forfeiture case, 
which taught that the government must at least attempt 
service on an incarcerated defendant in the place where he 
is being detained. Second, it cited Herbert v. United States, 
1996 WL 355333 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 1996), aff 'd without 
opinion, 103 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 1996), which declared that 
notice to the prison in which the defendant was 
incarcerated met due process requirements. Because it was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The relevant precedents in this area involve both judicial and 
administrative forfeitures. Insofar as both judicial and administrative 
forfeiture proceedings carry the potential to affect the property rights 
of 
the owner, there would appear to be no reason to distinguish between 
the notice required by the Due Process Clause in the two situations. At 
all events, the issue presented in this appeal solely concerns judicial 
forfeitures. 
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not affirmed by a published opinion, Herbert  is not 
precedential under our Internal Operating Procedures. See, 
e.g., United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 892 n.11 (3d Cir. 
1994); IOP S 6.2.1 (2000 ed.). The District Court 
nevertheless reasoned that the two cases indicate that, in 
this circuit, attempting service by mail to a prisoner in jail 
meets due process requirements. 
 
We have never addressed the specific claim that McGlory 
urges upon us now. Our most recent pronouncement on 
the issue, which also involved McGlory, held no more than 
that the government agency pursuing the forfeiture must 
send notice to the facility at which the detainee is actually 
incarcerated and that it may not rely on another agency to 
do so. See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664 (3d Cir. 
2000) (en banc). We turn then to consideration of whether 
due process requires the government to go further and 
provide actual notice to an incarcerated defendant against 
whom it has initiated forfeiture proceedings. 
 
A. 
 
Our analysis perforce begins with Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust, Co, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), which 
established the framework for evaluating the adequacy of 
notice for due process purposes. As described by the 
Supreme Court, the judgment is a highly contextual one. 
"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accordedfinality 
is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action 
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." 
Id. at 314 (emphasis added). A person or entity seeking to 
give notice must employ means "such as one desirous of 
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to 
accomplish it." Id. at 315. 
 
Under this framework, it is clear that when an 
incarcerated individual is the one being served, the serving 
party must attempt to effect service where the prisoner may 
be found--that is, in prison, not the pre-incarceration 
address. See Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 40 (1972) 
(per curiam). As the Magistrate Judge's report recounted, 
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this Court has ruled that notices in other forfeiture 
proceedings involving McGlory were inadequate when they 
did not attempt to reach him where he was incarcerated. 
See United States v. $184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
 
B. 
 
The government argues that precedent supports the 
conclusion that direct mail always satisfies due process 
requirements. Indeed, Supreme Court authority indicates 
that mailing to the location where the party can be found 
usually suffices for due process purposes. See Mullane, 339 
U.S. at 318. In Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 
U.S. 791, 800 (1983), the Court opined, "[n]otice by mail or 
other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a 
minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which 
will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any 
party . . . if its name and address are reasonably 
ascertainable." The government points to this language and 
to Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 
478 (1988), for the proposition that notice by direct mail 
suffices to establish its successful discharge of its 
obligations to McGlory under the Due Process Clause. See 
id. at 490 ("We have repeatedly recognized that mail service 
is an inexpensive and efficient mechanism that is 
reasonably calculated to provide actual notice."). 
 
While this argument carries strong surface appeal, it 
ignores the framework that Mullane decreed. Precedents 
endorsing direct mail as a means of meeting constitutional 
notice requirements in certain contexts do not establish 
that such mailings result in per se satisfaction of notice 
requirements. Adequacy of notice is always evaluated by 
reference to the surrounding circumstances. See Mullane, 
339 U.S. at 314. "The focus is on the reasonableness of the 
balance, and, as Mullane itself made clear, whether a 
particular method of notice is reasonable depends on the 
particular circumstances." Tulsa Professional Collection 
Serv., 485 U.S. at 484. For example, in Covey v. Town of 
Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1956), the Supreme Court 
held that notice sent to an incompetent taxpayer was 
inadequate, notwithstanding that the notice was sent by 
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direct mail. Though the facts of Covey are not, of course, 
analogous to the case at hand, that case's disposition 
stands as a stark example of the imprudence of gleaning 
from Supreme Court precedent a per se rule that mail will 
always be adequate notice. The proper effort at giving 
notice, the effort "such as one desirous of actually 
informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to 
accomplish it," Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, will vary under 
the circumstances. 
 
C. 
 
Our sister circuits have differed on what kind of notice is 
the constitutional minimum for incarcerated individuals 
whose property is subject to forfeiture. United States v. 
Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 380 (10th Cir. 1996), involved the 
government's attempt to serve notice of an administrative 
forfeiture to a pre-trial detainee by mailing it to the facility 
where he was actually held. The Tenth Circuit held that 
this notice met the demands of due process, even if the 
party served did not actually receive the mailed notice. See 
id. at 381. In concluding that the notice was sufficient, the 
court employed a logic similar to that urged by the 
government and pointed to the Supreme Court's indication 
in Mennonite Bd. of Missions that mail is a constitutionally 
acceptable form of notice. See id. "We have found no case 
suggesting that service by mail is inadequate or requiring 
the government to personally serve an interested party at 
the place of incarceration. We decline to create such a 
requirement here." Id. 
 
Other courts of appeals, however, have required more. In 
Weng v. United States, 137 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1998), the 
Second Circuit announced a requirement of actual notice. 
Weng involved several administrative forfeiture notices, one 
of which was sent by certified mail to the federal facility at 
which the defendant was detained. See id. at 714. The 
court determined that Mullane's balancing analysis 
compelled more. Noting the importance of the property 
interest at stake to the party notified and his inability to 
rely on others to vindicate those interests, see id. at 714- 
15, the court declared that the interests and burdens on 
the other side of the scale were less pronounced."[A]t least 
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where the owner is in federal custody on the very charges 
that justify a federal agency in seeking the forfeiture, there 
is no undue hardship to the agency in insuring that the 
owner-prisoner actually receive the legally required 
notification." Id. at 715. The court further noted the 
disparity in the parties' relative ability to take precautions 
to ensure the prisoner's receipt of notice. 
 
       First, as a prisoner, the owner is unable to insure that 
       he will receive the notice once the post office has 
       delivered it to the institution. The owner is entirely 
       dependent on the institution to deliver his mail to him. 
       Second, because the owner's jailor--the Bureau of 
       Prisons--is part of the same government . . . as the 
       agency seeking to give notice, the forfeiting agent can 
       in all probability easily secure the Bureau's cooperation 
       in assuring that the notice will be delivered to the 
       owner and that a reliable record of the delivery will be 
       created. 
 
Id. 
 
The court concluded that, under the circumstances, 
merely sending notice to the detention facility without 
ensuring actual delivery to the prisoner is not notice "such 
as one desirous of actually informing [the owner] might 
reasonably adopt." Id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315). 
Instead, the court held that when the prisoner is in federal 
custody on the charges that are the basis of the forfeiture, 
"mailing of a notice to the custodial institution is not 
adequate unless the notice is in fact delivered to the 
intended recipient." Id.; see also United States v. Woodall, 
12 F.3d 791, 794-95 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f the government is 
incarcerating or prosecuting the property owner when it 
elects to impose the additional burden of defending a 
forfeiture proceeding, fundamental fairness surely requires 
that either the defendant or his counsel receive actual 
notice of the agency's intent to forfeit in time to decide 
whether to compel the agency to proceed by judicial 
condemnation."). 
 
As Weng recites, the circumstances of prisoners differ 
greatly from free citizens, a fact that potentially alters the 
evaluation of what steps are reasonably calculated to 
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provide notice. When an individual is incarcerated at a 
location of the government's choosing, the government's 
ability to find and directly serve him or her with papers is 
at or near its zenith. Not only does the government know 
where to find the person, it can be equally sure that he or 
she will be there when the papers are delivered. Indeed, it 
can even move the person to a more convenient location if 
it so chooses. This appears especially the case where, as 
here, ongoing criminal proceedings against the prisoner 
brought the prisoner into frequent face-to-face contact with 
government attorneys. 
 
For his part, a prisoner lacks the ability to take steps to 
ensure that his mail is actually delivered to him. This 
dilemma is especially acute for a prisoner who may be 
transferred from facility to facility, complicating efforts to 
effect service. In the outside world, an individual who 
changes addresses can arrange to have mail forwarded and 
can notify interested parties as to the change of address. 
While a prisoner may take similar steps, the effectiveness of 
these measures may depend in some degree on such 
independent factors as prison policies vis-a-vis the 
forwarding of mail or the amount of forewarning a prisoner 
receives of an impending transfer. We also note that a 
prisoner may not know how long he or she will be at the 
changed address, which may make prison forwarding 
difficult. Shades of the same problem also exist for a 
prisoner who is not moved, but remains at one facility. If a 
person lives in an apartment building where the 
distribution of mail among the residents leads to lost 
missives, that person has some recourse, through 
complaint or, possibly, moving elsewhere. Such options are 
necessarily curtailed for the prisoner. 
 
The relative burdens and benefits of additional steps to 
ensure actual notice, therefore, suggest that requiring 
greater efforts at assuring notice by the government is 
appropriate. In other words, there is much to commend the 
Weng approach, and as an aspiration, the Weng rule 
comports with our ideas of the sort of effort that the 
government should undertake when it wishes to effect 
notice of a forfeiture proceeding against a prisoner in 
federal custody. On the other hand, Weng involved a 
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prisoner held in a federal, rather than a state, facility. As 
the Seventh Circuit has observed, "[t]he prophylactic Weng 
rule, requiring actual notice, becomes less reasonable as 
the federal government exercises less control over the 
detainee." Donovan v. United States, 172 F.3d 53, 1999 WL 
50847, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). The rejoinder to this 
argument is that, though McGlory was held in a state 
facility, he was held pursuant to his arrest on federal 
charges, and in contracting with state facilities to house 
pre-trial detainees, the federal government has the ability to 
demand procedures that will allow the delivery of adequate 
notice for prisoners. 
 
Though attractive, the Weng rule does present problems. 
The real difficulty with the Weng rule lies not in requiring 
the government to demonstrate actual notice, but rather 
the evidentiary burden that such a standard could impose 
after the passage of time. Given the temporal gap that may 
separate a forfeiture from a due process challenge to the 
proceedings, it is easy to imagine situations in which proof 
of the delivery of notice may be unavailable, even if such 
notice was properly served. An overly strict notice 
requirement, therefore, could lead to unsettling the 
outcome of completed proceedings based on nothing but 
bare allegations of a party who had lost property. 
 
More importantly, the Weng approach undermines the 
procedural analysis that has heretofore animated the 
Supreme Court's dictates on this subject. The Court has 
never employed an actual notice standard in its 
jurisprudence. Rather, its focus has always been on the 
procedures in place to effect notice. See, e.g. , Mennonite Bd. 
of Missions, 462 U.S. at 799-80.3 We think this focus 
appropriate. Thus, while we will not adopt the Weng rule, 
the concerns animating Weng will inform our decision as to 
the procedures designed to give notice. We hold that, while 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. It is true that Tulsa Prof. Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 
485 
(1988), speaks in terms of requiring "actual notice" to those with a 
liberty or property interest at stake in a proceeding. That opinion, 
however, also describes mail service as an acceptable means of providing 
actual notice. See id. at 490. In our view, therefore, "actual notice" is 
employed not as a rule, but rather as a goal against which various forms 
of effecting actual notice are evaluated. 
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the government need not prove actual notice to the 
prisoner, if it chooses to rely on less than actual notice, it 
bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of 
procedures that are reasonably calculated to ensure that 
such notice will be given. Thus, our rule requires the 
government to ensure that proper procedures are employed 
in the facilities where it chooses to house its prisoners.4 Of 
course, if there is a signed receipt from the served party, 
the government does not then have to prove anything about 
the procedures that were in place.5 
 
Because the District Court did not make findings on the 
sort of procedures in place at the facility at which McGlory 
was housed and whether these procedures were reasonably 
calculated to ensure that the notice, once addressed to 
McGlory, would still reach him upon arrival at the prison 
(and indeed, would only be accepted were McGlory actually 
present), we will vacate the District Court's ruling as to the 
jewelry forfeiture and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Our ruling is analogous to the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir. 1998). In that 
case, the court declined to require actual notice to a forfeiture 
defendant 
when notice was sent by certified mail to the facility in which he was 
held awaiting trial and evidence was presented that the facility handled 
certified mail to inmates by opening the letters in their presence and, 
after checking for contraband, giving the contents directly to them. See 
id. at 1315. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that 
sufficient notice was given. See id. at 1316. 
 
5. Our approach would also apply to the problem of the relocated 
prisoner. Just as the government can monitor whether mail reaches a 
prisoner within a facility, it can similarly ensure that mail will follow 
an 
inmate who is transferred from one facility to another. See generally 
Small v. United States, 136 F.3d 1334, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (deeming 
notice inadequate when notice sent to jail and returned absent 
indication that effort to find prisoner for resending would be burdensome 
to government); Armendariz-Mata v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, D.E.A., 82 F.3d 
679, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding notice inadequate when notice to jail 
returned undelivered and sender made no further inquiry). 
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III. 
 
In the forfeiture proceeding regarding the Toshiba 
television and other electronic equipment, the government 
made no attempt to serve McGlory in jail. For due process 
purposes, therefore, the attempted notice was clearly 
inadequate. Though the government concedes the 
constitutional deficiency of its notice, it contends, and the 
District Court agreed, that McGlory's motion to vacate 
judgment on this forfeiture is precluded by the doctrine of 
laches. We disagree. 
 
A. 
 
The District Court treated McGlory's motion as arising 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but concluded 
that the improper notice given by the government of the 
forfeiture proceedings rendered the judgments, as applied 
against him, "voidable" rather than "void," as provided by 
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b)(4). We think this conclusion 
incorrect. As a general matter, we have held that the entry 
of a default judgment without proper service of a complaint 
renders that judgment void. See Gold Kist, Inc. v. 
Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 756 F.2d 14, 19 (3d Cir. 1985). The 
majority of courts of appeals to consider the fate of a prior 
forfeiture proceeding that violated notice requirements 
agree that a judgment issued without proper notice to a 
potential claimant is void. See United States v. Marolf, 173 
F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1999); Clymore v. United States, 
164 F.3d 569, 573 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999); Muhammed v. 
D.E.A., Asset Forfeiture Unit, 92 F.3d 648, 654 (8th Cir. 
1996); Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 
661 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Giraldo , 45 F.3d 509, 
512 (1st Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Dusenbery, 
201 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2000) (treating forfeiture as 
voidable rather than void); Boero v. D.E.A., 111 F.3d 301, 
307 (2d Cir. 1997) (same). 
 
In light of our decision in Gold Kist, we are in accord with 
the majority view. Gold Kist involved a service of a 
summons and complaint in a manner that did not conform 
with Pennsylvania law. See Gold Kist, 756 F.2d at 18. 
Defendants in that action challenged the default judgment 
 
                                15 
  
entered against them. Citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b)(4), we 
declared that "[a] default judgment entered when there has 
been no proper service of complaint is, a fortiori, void, and 
should be set aside." Id. at 19. Because of the complaint's 
improper service, as well as the entry of default judgment 
before the expiration of the time for filing an answer, see 
id., the Gold Kist panel refrained from considering other 
factors that could also justify the setting aside of a default 
judgment. See id. 
 
The same logic applies here. Though we understand the 
concern expressed by the Sixth Circuit in Dusenbery that a 
prisoner claimant could sit on his or her rights until after 
the passage of the statute of limitations for the government 
to reinitiate a proceeding, see Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 768, 
we conclude that this concern can be addressed by other 
means, see id. at 769 (Cole, J., dissenting). As we explain 
below, a holding that the forfeiture against McGlory's 
property was void does not equate to a ruling that he is 
entitled to a return of the property or monetary relief from 
the government, because a Rule 60(b) motion is not a claim 
for the return of property. McGlory will therefore have to 
pursue further proceedings to recover his property, and it 
is in these proceedings that the government may invoke 
defenses that are predicated on McGlory's alleged delay. 
 
B. 
 
The District Court ruled that McGlory's motion to vacate 
was barred by the doctrine of laches. The doctrine of laches 
hails from equity, and is invoked when two essential 
elements exist: inexcusable delay in instituting suit, and 
prejudice resulting to the defendant from such delay. See 
Central Penn. Teamsters Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray 
Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 1108 (3d Cir. 1996). We conclude 
that the District Court was incorrect to have applied laches 
analysis to McGlory's motion. 
 
McGlory's motion was to vacate the forfeiture judgments 
against him and is treated, as discussed above, as arising 
under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 60(b). It is understandable why the 
District Court may have thought that the doctrine of laches 
applied. A motion under Rule 60(b) is equitable in nature, 
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so it is reasonable to believe that equitable doctrines apply. 
See Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1947) 
("The proceeding by motion to vacate a judgment is not an 
independent suit in equity but a legal remedy in a court of 
law; yet the relief is equitable in character and must be 
administered upon equitable principles."); see also Winfield 
Assocs., Inc. v. W.L. Stonecipher, 429 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th 
Cir. 1970) ("Rule 60(b) . . . specifically preserves the right 
to attack a judgment by an independent equitable action."); 
In re Brown, 68 F.R.D. 172, 174 (D.D.C. 1975) (describing 
Rule 60(b) as codification of methods of gaining equitable 
relief from judgments). 
 
In light of our ruling that the judgment against McGlory 
in the electronic equipment forfeiture is void, however, no 
passage of time can transmute a nullity into a binding 
judgment, and hence there is no time limit for such a 
motion. It is true that the text of the rule dictates that the 
motion will be made within "a reasonable time." See Fed. R. 
Civ. Proc. 60(b). However, nearly overwhelming authority 
exists for the proposition that there are no time limits with 
regards to a challenge to a void judgment because of its 
status as a nullity; thus laches is no bar to recourse to 
Rule 60(b)(4). See Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 
F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (11th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); 
Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1993); Katter 
v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 765 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir. 
1985); In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 
(9th Cir. 1985); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn , 450 F.2d 
257, 260 (10th Cir. 1971); Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 
343 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Moore v. Positive Safety Manufacturing 
Co., 107 F.R.D. 49, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Rodd v. 
Region Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he 
reasonable time criterion of Rule 60(b) as it relates to void 
judgments, means no time limit because a void judgment is 
no judgment at all.") (citation and quotation omitted). 
 
We agree that no passage of time can render a void 
judgment valid, and a court may always take cognizance of 
a judgment's void status whenever a Rule 60(b) motion is 
brought. Without addressing any other reason to bar a Rule 
60(b) motion that attacks a judgment as void,6 we hold that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We also note that McGlory's delay vis-a-vis attacking the judgment (as 
opposed to inquiring into the disposition of his property, an issue that 
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laches may not be used to preclude such a motion. Cf. 
Micro Leasing, 450 F.2d at 260 ("The cases say that a void 
judgment acquires no validity as the result of laches on the 
part of the adverse party. We are not asked to consider 
whether under any particular circumstances a movant 
under Rule 60(b) may be estopped or precluded fromfiling 
such a motion.") (footnote omitted). 
 
C. 
 
Though we hold that laches is not available to preclude 
a claimant from attacking a void judgment, our holding is 
not to be construed as allowing a petitioner to sit on his or 
her rights. It is true that if a court is able to determine that 
a prior judgment is indeed void, it should declare it as 
such, but that does not mean that other remedies, such as 
the actual return of property or its cash value, are immune 
from defenses of waiver or laches. In other words, we 
conclude that the potential prejudice that arises from such 
delay is best dealt with outside of the Rule 60(b) context. 
 
Whether McGlory unreasonably delayed in seeking 
recovery of his property in general, which is the laches 
issue considered by the District Court, is a matter distinct 
from whether the judgment that forfeited the property was 
void. That is not, however, a matter that is before this 
Court. We are only reviewing the denial of McGlory's motion 
to vacate. Even if he prevails on this motion, that does not 
mean that he is entitled to any monetary relief or relief in 
the form of a transfer of property. It has been held that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
is not before us) was clearly not unreasonable. He maintains that he 
promptly sought relief from the judgments against him once he learned 
of them in 1994, and the District Court made no factfindings that 
indicate that McGlory learned of the judgments at an earlier date. Nor 
does this appear to be a situation in which McGlory can be accused of 
having waived his ability to bring a Rule 60(b) motion, as he did not 
previously launch a Rule 60(b) attack against the judgments. Cf. Beller 
& Keller v. Tyler, 120 F.3d 21, 23-24 (2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that 
laches cannot give a void judgment validity, but suggesting that a motion 
may be untimely when the voidness challenge is raised on a successive 
motion to vacate). 
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Rule 60(b) does not provide for such remedies. See United 
States v. One 1961 Red Chevrolet Impala Sedan, 457 F.2d 
1353, 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that monetary 
remedy for void forfeiture, which depends on waiver of 
sovereign immunity, lies not in Rule 60(b) but in 28 U.S.C. 
S 1346(a)); see also United States v. $119,980.00, 680 F.2d 
106, 107-08 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding Rule 60(b) may not 
be used to impose affirmative relief beyond setting aside 
prior judgment); United States v. One Douglas A-26B 
Aircraft, 662 F.2d 1372, 1377 (11th Cir. 1981) (same). In 
order to obtain such relief, McGlory may have to look 
elsewhere. 
 
It is in the pursuit of his remedies that McGlory's delay, 
if any, will become an issue. Though the vacatur of the 
earlier judgment will be a powerful weapon for McGlory in 
such an effort, it will not decide the issue. McGlory would 
have to act within the confines of whatever legal framework 
surrounds the legal or equitable remedy he will elect to 
pursue. At that time, the District Court may consider 
whether the doctrine of laches applies, or whether the six- 
year statute of limitations for suits against the federal 
government is applicable. See 28 U.S.C.S 2401(a). It would 
appear that the federal statute applies, see Menkarell v. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 1972) 
(applying six-year statute of limitations of 28 U.S.C. 
S 2401(a) in attempt to recover forfeited property), even if 
the action is characterized as equitable, see, e.g., 
Blassingame v. Secretary of Navy, 811 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 
1987) ("[T]he merger of law and equity assured that section 
2401(a) covers both legal and equitable actions."). 
 
If the District Court concludes laches analysis to be in 
order anyway, it will have to determine the interplay 
between laches and the relevant statute of limitations, 
giving consideration to the cases that indicate that if a suit 
is brought within the statutory period, laches would 
generally be unavailable. See, e.g., Central Penn. Teamsters 
Pension Fund v. McCormick Dray Line, Inc., 85 F.3d 1098, 
1108 (3d Cir. 1996); Henry v. United States, 46 F.2d 640, 
642 (3d Cir. 1931) ("While there is no statute of limitations 
in equity, yet it generally in this respect follows the law, 
and will, in the absence of special extenuating 
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circumstances . . . regard the delay as inexcusable and 
refuse relief after the time of the statute of limitations in 
that particular locality has expired."); Ikelionwu v. United 
States, 150 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1998) (declining to 
invoke laches when suit to recover forfeited property 
brought within statutory period). Also, insofar as it 
considers the doctrines of equity, the District Court will 
also have to consider whether the party asserting the 
defense of laches has clean hands. See United States v. 
Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to 
reverse district court's rejection of laches defense in light of 
government's "inexplicable fail[ure] to remedy" an improper 
administrative notice or initiate proper judicial 
proceedings). 
 
We reference the foregoing authority not to express any 
view on the merits but only to flag important issues that 
the District Court did not appear to consider in its analysis 
of laches. At all events, we make no ruling on issues of 
inexcusable delay because all we have before us is the 
motion to vacate, and, as we have held, laches analysis 
does not apply to such a motion. Finally, in ruling that the 
judgment in the electronic equipment forfeiture is void, we 
offer no opinion as to whether the government is prohibited 
from reinitiating the forfeiture action against McGlory or if 
the passage of the relevant statute of limitations has been 
tolled. The District Court will have to consider the issue 
should the government attempt to reinitiate such 
proceedings. 
 
The judgment of the District Court will be vacated and 
the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting: 
 
I join parts I and III of the opinion of the court and 
concur in the judgment insofar as it relates to No. 98-3578. 
However, I respectfully dissent from the court's disposition 
of No. 98-3579 and from part II of the opinion of the court, 
which adopts an interpretation of due process that has no 
basis in prior decisions of the Supreme Court or our circuit. 
 
The question before us is not whether it would be good 
policy to require the government in forfeiture proceedings to 
provide notice to interested parties by some means superior 
to the mail. Rather, the question is whether the government 
complied with the minimum requirements of the Due Process 
Clause by sending notice by mail (return receipt requested) 
to McGlory at the facility where he was detained. Under 
Supreme Court precedent, this met constitutional 
standards. The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to 
the service of notice by mail as sufficient to satisfy the 
minimum requirements of due process. See, e.g. , Tulsa 
Prof 'l Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988); 
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800 
(1983) ("Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure 
actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a 
proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or 
property interests of [a] party . . . ."). 1 
 
The majority seemingly acknowledges that service by mail 
sent to the addressee's current address is constitutionally 
adequate in almost all other contexts, but the majority 
holds that such notice may not be sufficient when sent to 
a detainee or prisoner. Why? Why is it that mail sent to, 
say, an inexpensive long-term-occupancy hotel is 
reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to 
apprise an interested party of the pendency of a forfeiture 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. On only one occasion has the Court held that notice by mail sent to 
the addressee's correct address was not constitutionally adequate. In 
Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956), the Court held that due 
process was violated where notice of foreclosure for delinquent taxes was 
mailed to a person who was known to be incompetent, lived alone, and 
had no guardian, no relatives in the state, and no other person who was 
able to help her with her taxes. Id. at 146-47. Thus, Somers hardly 
supports the majority's holding here. 
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action but mail sent to a jail or prison may not be? The 
answer must be that there is a significantly higher 
probability that mail sent to such hotels will reach the 
addressees than is the case with mail sent to a jail or 
prison. But where is the evidence that this is so? The 
majority studiously avoids this point--for the very good 
reason that no evidence whatsoever to this effect has been 
adduced, by McGlory, the majority in this case, or any 
other judicial opinion of which I am aware. Such systemic 
problems may or may not exist; I don't know; and I doubt 
that my colleagues do either. But without such evidence, 
there is no logical basis for the majority's decision. 
 
It may well be that it would be advisable for those with 
legislative or rulemaking authority to require the 
government in forfeiture cases to provide better notice than 
is required by the minimum standard imposed by due 
process. Congress has recently manifested concern about 
the fairness of federal forfeiture procedures and has 
enacted the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. 
L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000), to remedy the 
problems that it found. This Act, however, does not require 
that notice of forfeiture be provided by some means better 
than the mail, but perhaps Congress should consider that 
question. Congress has the capability--which the federal 
courts plainly lack--to investigate whether notice of 
forfeiture sent by mail fails to reach the addressee in a 
significant number of cases. (The mere fact that McGlory 
and a handful of other federal prisoners and detainees have 
claimed that they did not receive notice sent by mail to 
their facilities is hardly enough to show the existence of a 
serious problem.) Congress also has the ability to craft a 
rule that is specifically targeted to deal with any problem it 
finds to exist. It can specify the addressees to which any 
such rule applies--e.g., all persons to whom notice is 
provided, only those in custody, only those in custody on 
federal charges, or only those in federal facilities. And it can 
provide that any new rule will not have retroactive effect. A 
court, in interpreting the Due Process Clause, lacks such 
flexibility." 
 
I have three additional observations about the majority's 
decision. First, although the decision formally applies only 
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to notices of forfeiture sent by the federal government to 
persons in custody on federal charges, its logic extends to 
any forfeiture notices sent to any persons in custody. If 
notice of a federal forfeiture proceeding that is sent by mail 
to a person in a state facility on federal charges is not 
reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to 
apprise that person of the pendency of the federal forfeiture 
proceeding, notice of a state forfeiture proceeding that is 
sent by mail to another person held in the same facility on 
state charges cannot be reasonably calculated to inform 
that person of the pendency of the state forfeiture 
proceeding. Thus, the majority's decision has a broad 
logical sweep. 
 
Second, the majority's standard regarding the adequacy 
of mail handling procedures is left open-ended and will 
almost certainly lead to confusion and litigation. Under the 
majority's decision, notice by mail to a detainee or prisoner 
satisfies due process only if the facility's mail handling 
procedures at the time in question were reasonably 
calculated to ensure that the notice reached the addressee. 
See Maj. Op. p. 14. What does this mean in practical 
terms? Must there be a written policy? Must the addressee 
sign a receipt? May delivery of the mail be entrusted to 
other detainees or prisoners? Must the mail be handed to 
the addressee personally? One or more rounds of litigation 
will almost certainly be required to answer these and 
related questions. 
 
Third, although the majority has attempted to devise a 
rule that will not impose an undue evidentiary burden in 
cases in which forfeiture judgments are sought to be 
vacated for lack of proper notice, the majority's decision 
may well prove quite difficult to administer. As previously 
noted, the majority's mail handling standard is murky, and 
attempting to establish what procedures were followed at 
various points in the past at the numerous state and 
federal facilities in which federal detainees and prisoners 
have been held may not be easy. And if the majority's 
decision is extended to state detainees and prisoners, as I 
think logic requires, the problem will be magnified. 
 
I would hold that due process was satisfied and leave it 
to the legislative or rulemaking processes to decide whether 
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additional notice requirements should be imposed in 
forfeiture cases. 
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